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Decisions under risk are often multidimensional, where the preferences of the decision maker 
depend on several attributes. For example, an individual might be concerned about both her 
level of wealth and the condition of her health. Many times the signs of successive cross 
derivatives of a utility function play an important role in these models. However, there has not 
been a simple and intuitive interpretation for the meaning of such derivatives. The purpose of 
this paper is to give such an interpretation. In particular, we provide an equivalence between 
the signs of these cross derivatives and individual preference within a particular class of 
simple lotteries. 
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Decisions often have multidimensional consequences with some, if not most,
of them being risky. Health insurance ￿whether private or public ￿is a
good example. Individuals pay insurance premia and/or taxes that a⁄ect
their level of wealth in order to receive medical treatment in case of illness.
Thanks to this treatment, they usually have improved health, although such
treatment is not without risk. The insurance program a⁄ects both the wealth
and the health of the policyholder.
There are many other settings for such multidimensional consequences
as well. For example, consider an intertemporal model in which prefer-
ences depend on the lifetime path of consumption. An individual must face
various trade-o⁄s between the levels and the riskiness of consumption in suc-
cessive time periods, thus presenting the individual with a multidimensional
decision. Labor economics also provides many examples of multidimensional
decision making under risk. In addition, the same techniques used in such a
decision context can be applied to analyzing multidimensional distributions
of economic status within the literature on income distribution.
Ever since the paper by Eisner and Strotz (1961), the literature on choices
under risk with multidimensional utilities has shown time and again that the
signs of successive cross derivatives of the utility function play an important
role. For example, if the sign of a certain derivative remains unchanged over
its domain, it sometimes leads to necessary or to su¢ cient conditions for
various comparative-static results.
While the comparative-static results themselves usually have some eco-
nomic interpretation, so far there is no simple and intuitive interpretation for
the signs of such derivatives on their own. What exactly does it imply when
we assume that one of these cross derivatives is always positive or is always
negative? The purpose of this paper is to give such an interpretation.
To accomplish our goal, we ￿rst de￿ne a preference ordering over a set of
simple lotteries. We start by reviewing the concept of "correlation aversion"
1as de￿ned by Epstein and Tanny (1980).1 We extend this lottery preference
to allow for multiple-dimension analogues of prudence and temperance, which
we label as "cross prudence" and "cross temperance." This follows along lines
suggested by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) in one dimension. We then
show how these particular lottery preferences are equivalent to signing the
cross derivatives if we use an expected-utility framework for our analysis.
More speci￿cally, we postulate two basic types of "harms" for someone
with preferences that are both monotonic and risk averse in each dimension.
In particular, such an individual will dislike a reduction in any attribute,
ceteris paribus. This individual also will dislike the introduction of a zero-
mean risk added to any attribute, assuming that the risk is independent of
other risks inherent in these attributes. For instance, an individual might
have such preferences over monetary wealth and some objective measure of
health, such as the individual￿ s own longevity. It is the interaction of these
types of harms upon one￿ s preferences that determine whether preferences
exhibit "correlation aversion" or "cross prudence" or "cross temperance."
We begin in the next section with a brief overview of some of the existing
literature for which the results are dependent upon the signs of various cross
derivatives of multidimensional utility functions. We next de￿ne our simple
lottery preferences. These preferences are then shown to be equivalent to
assuming particular signs for various cross derivatives of the utility function
when used in an expected utility framework. Our main tool of analysis is
the ￿utility premium,￿as de￿ned by Friedman and Savage (1948), which in a
certain sense measures the level of "pain" associated with taking a particular
risk and thus turns out to be particularly appropriate in determining how
various harms either exacerbate or mitigate one another when taken in tan-
dem. We then present some applications of the results to speci￿c problems
within an intertemporal-choice framework. Our concluding remarks focus on
1To the best of our knowledge, this concept ￿rst appeared in de Finetti (1952). It
was brought into the economic literature, though under di⁄erent terminology, by Richard
(1975).
2the applicability of our results.
2 Some Multivariate Models
Our goal in this section is not to present a complete survey of the literature
of multivariate risk taking, which is quite large, but rather to give a sample
of the types of results that appear in the extant literature. To the best of our
knowledge, one of the ￿rst papers to discuss the sign of the cross derivative
of the utility function was by Eisner and Strotz (1961), who analyzed the
demand for ￿ ight insurance. They remarked how the sensitivity of marginal
utility of wealth to a nonpecuniary variable is quite relevant in many areas,
such as health insurance and ￿ ight insurance for example. Their observation
provides an introduction to the notion of "correlation aversion," that will be
discussed in the next section.
In the area of labor economics, papers by Eaton and Rosen (1980) and
by Tressler and Menezes (1980) discuss the impact of wage uncertainty and
of taxation on the supply of labor. Comparative-static results in both of
these papers require that one be able to sign the third cross derivative of a
utility function. As we show later in the paper, signing this cross derivative
is equivalent to a particular lottery preference and to a concept we label as
"cross prudence."
Rather similar results are found in the literature on health economics. In
a paper on the demand for medical care, Dardanoni and Wagsta⁄(1990) use
a utility function that depends upon consumption and health status. They
show how the demand for care depends on the signs of both the second and
third cross derivatives of the utility function.2 A recent paper by Bleichrodt,
et al. (2003) models the e⁄ects of comorbidities on medical-treatment deci-
sions and shows that the sign of the fourth cross derivative of utility plays
2They also show how the signs of the second and third own derivative matter as well. It
is interesting to note that Dardanoni (1988) published an earlier paper of a more general
nature, dealing with "two-argument utility functions."
3a role in analyzing the optimal decisions. We show in the next section how
signing these cross derivatives is once again equivalent to a particular lottery
preference that we label as "cross-temperance."
One also can view the vast literature on intertemporal consumption and
savings decisions as belonging to the class of multivariate risk taking models,
where lifetime utility depends upon the vector of lifetime consumption ￿ ows.
Early papers by Leland (1968), Sandmo (1970) and DrŁze and Modigliani
(1972) examined how the demand for savings reacts to income risk and
interest-rate risk. Indeed, the authors noted how their results were depen-
dent, in part, to how risk aversion with respect to one argument of the utility
function (for example, future consumption) reacted to a change in another
argument (for example, current consumption). Although we do not discuss
their cross derivatives directly here, we show in section 5 how several in-
tertemporal decisions, based on multivariate preference within each period,
can be modelled directly.
Finally, we note that the concepts referred to here in the context of analyz-
ing consumer choice under multivariate risk have an applicability to the large
literature on multidimensional income inequality. In an important paper fo-
cussed on the distribution of "economic status," Atkinson and Bourguignon
(1982) show again how many results depend upon the cross derivative of the
welfare function, up to a third order. Many re￿nements and applications in
this area continue to depend on the signs of such cross derivatives.3
3 Lottery Preference
We restrict the analysis here to bivariate preferences. The analysis can apply
to higher dimensions by ￿xing all but two of the attribute levels. Let (x;y) 2
R2
+ denote a nonnegative vector of attributes. For the sake of concreteness,
3The literature is too large to give a complete set of references, but the papers by
Wagsta⁄, et al. (1991), Moyes (1999) and Trannoy (2005) are good examples.
4will interpret the variable x as wealth and y as health, although certainly
numerous other interpretations are possible. We assume that both higher
levels of wealth and higher levels of health are preferred. Here health is
measured by some objective measure, such as longevity. We also assume that
the individual is risk averse in each dimension separately. Given a random
wealth e x, the individual would prefer Ee x to e x for every accompanying health
level y. The same is assumed to hold if we reverse the roles of x and y.
3.1 Correlation Aversion
Let k and c be arbitrary positive constants. De￿ne an individual as being
correlation averse if the lottery [(x￿k;y);(x;y￿c)] is preferred to the lottery
[(x;y);(x ￿ k;y ￿ c)] for all (x;y) 2 R2
+ such that x ￿ k > 0 and y ￿ c > 0.
In this lottery, as well as all other simple lotteries in this paper, we assume
that each outcome of the lottery has an equally likely chance of occurrence.
In other words, someone is correlation averse if he or she always prefers a
50-50 gamble of a loss in wealth or a loss in health over another 50-50 gamble
o⁄ering a loss in neither dimension or a loss in both. This concept was ￿rst
introduced by Richard (1975), although he used a di⁄erent terminology, and
was explored further by Epstein and Tanny (1980) in a setting where x and
y denote consumption levels in two consecutive time periods.
For a correlation-averse individual, a higher level of health mitigates the
detrimental e⁄ect of a reduction in wealth. Given the lottery [(x;y);(x;y￿c)]
and being told that one must reduce wealth to level x ￿ k, but only for
one realization of the lottery, this individual would rather reduce wealth
in the state of the world in which health is better. Note that the roles of
wealth and health are completely arbitrary here and that we obtain the same
characterization if they are switched.
We will call an individual correlation loving if the preference ordering
for the above lotteries is always reversed. Obviously, either one of these
assumptions is quite strong and an individual need not exhibit either of
5these traits. We make no normative claim here about an individual￿ s being
correlation averse. For example, a rational individual might decide that
money is less valuable if he or she is not healthy enough to enjoy it. To
such an individual, wealth and health behave like complements, and such an
individual is correlation loving. On the other hand, money and health might
behave as substitutes. Indeed someone in ill health might feel that money is
more useful at the margin, since it can used in bettering the quality of life.
3.2 Cross Prudence and Cross Temperance4
Now let e " be an arbitrary zero-mean wealth random variable. We will say
that an individual is cross prudent in health if the lottery [(x+e ";y);(x;y￿c)]
is preferred to the lottery [(x;y);(x +e ";y ￿ c)] for all (x;y) 2 R2
+ such that
y ￿ c > 0 and Supp[x + e "] ￿ R+.5 For such an individual, a higher level
of health mitigates the detrimental e⁄ect of the monetary risk e ". Given
the lottery [(x;y);(x;y ￿ c)] and being told that one must add the risk e "
to wealth level x, but only for one realization of the lottery, this individual
would rather add the harm e " in the state of the world in which health is
better, y rather than y ￿ c.
In a similar manner, let e ￿ be an arbitrary zero-mean health random vari-
able. An individual is cross prudent in wealth if the lottery [(x;y +e ￿);(x ￿
k;y)] is preferred to the lottery [(x;y);(x￿k;y +e ￿)] for all (x;y) 2 R2
+ such
that x￿k > 0 and Supp[y+e ￿] ￿ R+. For such an individual, higher wealth
helps to temper the detrimental e⁄ects of accepting the health risk e ￿.
If either of the above sets of lottery preferences is always reversed, then we
will refer to individual preferences as being cross imprudent in either wealth
or health. For example, to someone who is cross imprudent in wealth,
4The term "prudence," in a univariate setting, was originally coined by Kimball (1990),
who showed how it equates to u000 > 0. The term temperance was also coined by Kimball
(1992).
5We take some liberty with the notation here. By Supp[x +e "] we mean the support
of the distribution function associated with the random variable x +e ".
6a higher level of wealth makes the addition of the health risk even more
aggravating.
Now assume thate " ande ￿ are statistically independent of one another. We
de￿ne preferences as being cross temperate if the lottery [(x+e ";y);(x;y+e ￿)]
is preferred to the lottery [(x;y);(x +e ";y +e ￿)] for all (x;y) 2 R2
+ such that
Supp[x + e "] ￿ Supp[y + e ￿] ￿ R2
+. To such an individual, the losses e " and
e ￿ are "mutually aggravating," to borrow terminology from Kimball (1993).
Note that such an individual prefers to disaggregate the two harmful risks e "
and e ￿.
3.3 A Lattice Structure
It is useful to note that the above sets of lottery preferences can be generalized
into a lattice structure. Consider the set of all possible harms as described
here. These include the negative constants (i.e. ￿c and ￿k) and the zero-
mean random variables (e " and e ￿) in the above analyses. Now de￿ne ￿ ￿
f￿,0g and ￿ ￿ f￿,0g, where ￿ is either ￿k or e ", and ￿ is either ￿c or e ￿. Let
(a;b) and (A;B) 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ such that x + a, x + A, y + b and y + B are all
nonnegative almost surely. We let "%" denote the weak preference relation
of the individual. Since x % x+￿ and y % y +￿, we always have the ability
to rank the consumer￿ s preference between x + a and x + A, and between
y + b and y + B. Note that the weak preference will be indi⁄erence in the
case where A = a and the case where B = b.
We now de￿ne the meet and join for (x + a;y + b) and (x + A;y + B).
Without loss of generality, assume that x + A % x + a. Then the join is
de￿ned as
(x + a;y + b) _ (x + A;y + B) = f
(x + A;y + B) if y + B % y + b
(x + A;y + b) if y + b % y + B
7and the meet is de￿ned as
(x + a;y + b) ^ (x + A;y + B) = f
(x + a;y + b) if y + B % y + b
(x + a;y + B) if y + b % y + B
:
In other words, the join pairs the better wealth outcome with the better
health outcome, whereas the meet pairs the worse wealth and health out-
comes. Since individual was assumed to be both monotone increasing and
risk averse in each dimension separately, our de￿nitions in this section ￿cor-
relation aversion, cross prudence and cross temperance ￿are analogous to
saying that a 50-50 gamble between (x+a;y+b) and (x+A;y+B) is always
weakly preferred to a 50-50 gamble between the meet and the join.
4 Relation to Utility
We now consider the case where the individual￿ s preferences can be repre-
sented by a bivariate model of expected utility. We let u(x;y) denote the
utility function and let u1(x;y) denote @u=@x and u2(x;y) denote @u=@y. We
follow the same subscript convention for the functions u11(x;y) and u12(x;y)
and so on. We assume that the partial derivatives required for any de￿nition
all exist. For any ￿xed value of y, we can apply the results of Eeckhoudt and
Schlesinger (2006) directly to interpret u111 > 0 and u1111 < 0 as prudence
in wealth and temperance in wealth respectively. Similarly, we can inter-
pret the signs of u222 and u2222 as equivalents to prudence and temperance
in health.
Our main result in this paper extends such interpretations to the cross
derivatives:
Proposition 1 The following equivalences hold:
(i) An individual is correlation averse if and only if u12 ￿ 0 8x;y
(ii) An individual is cross prudent in health if and only if u112 ￿ 0 8x;y
(iii) An individual is cross prudent in wealth if and only if u122 ￿ 0 8x;y
8(iv) An individual is cross temperate if and only if u1122 ￿ 0 8x;y:
We make no normative claim here as to whether or not individuals exhibit
any or all of the above properties.6 We also make no claim as to whether
or not expected utility is an appropriate model of consumer preference. For
example, given a 50-50 gamble between adding a (zero-mean) risk in either
health or wealth or a 50-50 chance of adding the risks to both health and
wealth or not adding any risks at all, it might be the case that the individual
sometimes chooses the later. This would imply that either u1122(x;y) > 0
at some values of (x;y) or that expected-utility does not perfectly explain
preferences.7
We should note that numerous examples exist with cross derivatives ex-
hibiting the signs in Proposition 1, as well as examples with exactly opposite
signs. For example, u(x;y) = ￿x￿￿y￿￿, with ￿ > 0 and ￿ > 0, agrees with
all of the signs in Proposition 1. On the other hand u(x;y) = x￿y￿, with
(￿;￿) 2 (0;1) ￿ (0;1), has exactly the opposite signs. However, consider
u(x;y) = xy ￿ 1
2x2y2, where we assume that wealth and health are scaled
so that 0 < x < 1 and 0 < y < 1. This utility exhibits cross temperance
but cross imprudence (u112 and u122 are everywhere negative). Moreover,
it exhibits correlation aversion only sometimes (if and only if xy > 1
2). In
addition, each of these utility functions exhibits the desirable unidirectional
6For example, in a very well scrutinized paper, Viscusi and Evans (1990) analyzed data
from workplace injuries and found evidence that the sign of u12 is positive, which of course
would imply that correlation aversion does not hold in their model. However, in Evans and
Viscusi (1991) they limited their evidence to minor injuries and found that u12 is almost
always negative in this case.
If the sign of u12 is not uniform throughout the relevant range, then for ￿xed values
of c and k, neither 50-50 lottery, [(x ￿ k;y);(x;y ￿ c)] or [(x;y);(x ￿ k;y ￿ c)]; is always
preferred over the other for all x;y.
7One example of the latter might be a case in which cross temperance holds when e "
and e ￿ are roughly of equal size (e.g. have the same variance), but does not hold if one of
the random variables is "small" compared to the other. Perhaps such an individual puts
a signi￿cant weight on the 50 percent probability of having no risk at all.
9properties: u1 > 0, u2 > 0, u11 < 0 and u22 < 0.8
The remainder of this section provides proofs for the various cases of the
above Proposition.
4.1 Correlation Aversion
The condition u12 ￿ 0 8(x;y) is equivalent to
u(x;y ￿ c) ￿ u(x ￿ k;y ￿ c) ￿ u(x;y) ￿ u(x ￿ k;y) 8c;k 2 R
2
++. (1)
But rearranging and multiplying by 1=2 shows that this is equivalent to
1
2
[u(x ￿ k;y) + u(x;y ￿ c)] ￿
1
2
[u(x;y) + u(x ￿ k;y ￿ c)], (2)
which is equivalent under expected utility to the lottery-preference de￿nition
of correlation aversion.9
4.2 Cross Prudence
For a ￿xed risk e ", de￿ne v(x;y) ￿ u(x;y) ￿ Eu(x +e ";y). This is simply an
analogue to the utility premium originally de￿ned by Friedman and Savage
(1948). It indicates the level of utility lost ￿or in a particular sense "the
amount of pain" ￿that is incurred when risk e " is added to x. Since the
individual is assumed to be risk averse in wealth, i.e. since u11 < 0, we have
v(x;y) > 0.
Taking the derivative with respect to y obtains v2(x;y) = u2(x;y) ￿
Eu2(x +e ";y). It follows from Jensen￿ s inequality that v2(x;y) ￿ 0 8(x;y) if
8Many additional two-attribute utility functions are discussed in Keeney and Rai⁄a
(1976).
9An alternative proof for this case appears in Richard (1975). Also, we do not investi-
gate the strength of correlation-averse behavior, which also would then examine measures
of correlation aversion "in the small." A paper by Bommier (2005) o⁄ers one approach in
this direction.
10and only if u2 is convex in x. In an expected utility setting, this is equivalent
to u112 ￿ 0. But now v2 ￿ 0 is equivalent to
u(x;y) ￿ Eu(x +e ";y) ￿ u(x;y ￿ c) ￿ Eu(x +e ";y ￿ c) 8c > 0: (3)
Again, rearranging and multiplying by 1=2 shows that this is equivalent to
our lottery-preference de￿nition of cross prudence in health.
A symmetric argument shows that cross prudence in wealth is equivalent
to u122 ￿ 0.
4.3 Cross Temperance
Taking the derivative of v2(x;y) above with respect to y obtains v22(x;y) =
u22(x;y)￿Eu22(x+e ";y). From Jensen￿ s inequality, it follows that v(x;y) is
convex in y; v22(x;y) ￿ 0 8(x;y); if and only if u22(x;y) is concave in x, i.e.
if and only if u1122(x;y) ￿ 0.
Now consider a ￿xed risk e ￿, where e ￿ is independent of e ". It follows that
v(x;y)￿Ev(x;y +e ￿) ￿ 0 if and only if v(x;y) is convex in y, which we have
just shown to be equivalent to u1122(x;y) ￿ 0. We complete the proof by
expanding v(x;y):
0 ￿ v(x;y) ￿ Ev(x;y +e ￿)
= [u(x;y) ￿ Eu(x +e ";y)] ￿ [Eu(x;y +e ￿) ￿ Eu(x +e ";y +e ￿)]:
(4)
Rearranging and multiplying by 1=2 shows that this is equivalent to our
lottery-preference de￿nition of cross temperance.
4.4 Submodularity
The lattice structure, described in the previous section, gives rise to sub-
modularity of a preference functional de￿ned over the lotteries. In particu-
lar, since expected utility is linear in the probabilities, we can think of the
11expected utility of the pair (x + a;y + b) as a bivariate functional, where
(a;b) 2 ￿￿￿ as de￿ned previously.10 The fact that a 50-50 gamble between
(x+a;y+b) and (x+A;y+B) is always weakly preferred to a 50-50 gamble
between the meet and the join is then equivalent to saying that our lottery
preference functional is submodular.11 Of course, this submodularity depends
upon preferences exhibiting correlation aversion, cross prudence in wealth,
cross prudence in health and cross temperance, as well as monotonicity and
risk aversion for both wealth and health separately.12
5 Applications
Numerous examples already appear in which the sign of u12 is signi￿cant
in determining the results, see for example Rey and Rochet (2004). In this
section, we provide a few applications based on intertemporal consumption
choices, where utility within each period depends upon two arguments. We
assume in all of the examples that u1 > 0, u2 > 0, u11 < 0 and u22 < 0,
which is also su¢ cient for all of the appropriate second-order conditions to
hold.
Although our interpretations in this paper have been based on preferences
over simple 50-50 lotteries, we can extend the logic in an obvious way to
10Again we take some liberty with the notation here. More formally, we have a functional
over the distribution functions for x + a and y + b.
11A function M is submodular over elements of a lattice if M(￿)+M(￿) ￿ M(￿_￿)+
M(￿ ^ ￿).
12Although we do not pursue it in the current paper, one can extend the results here to
higher dimensions along lines similar to those in Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006). For
example, we can rede￿ne ￿ in section 3:3 as a set containing two lotteries:
(i) lottery A, which is a 50-50 chance of ￿k or e "
and
(ii) lottery a, which is a 50-50 chance of ￿k +e " or zero.
Lotteries A and a then become our two "harms." From Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006),
we know that (x+A;y) is weakly preferred to (x+a;y) for all x and for all y, if and only
if u111(x;y) ￿ 0. Determining when utility is submodular for this lattice structure will
determine the signs of u1112 and u11122.
12intertemporal choices for which intratemporal utility is the same within each
period. For example, we know that u11 < 0 implies a type of risk aversion
in the ￿rst attribute x, but we also know that u11 < 0 induces a preference
for "smoothing" the level of x over time. In such as setting, correlation
aversion can be interpreted in a type of time-series sense. The correlation
averse individual prefers the time sequence [(x ￿ k;y) ￿! (x;y ￿ c)] to the
time sequence [(x;y) ￿! (x ￿ k;y ￿ c)]. The examples below are in this
spirit.
Suppose that the consumer wishes to maximize her utility of consumption
of wealth and of health over two dates. We will assume that the optimization
problem is to choose a level of savings s to
maxU(s) = u(x ￿ s;y) + ￿u(x + s(1 + r);y), (5)
where x is the consumer￿ s income in each period, r is a risk-free rate of
interest earned on any savings, and ￿ is a personal discount factor for future
utility. In the simplest case, we set ￿ = (1 + r)￿1 = 1. This yields the ￿rst
order-condition
U
0(s) = ￿u1(x ￿ s;y) + u1(x + s;y) = 0; (6)
yielding a solution of s￿ = 0. The second order condition is trivially satis￿ed.
Although (5) does not refer to a lottery per se, note that multiplying U(s)
by 1=2 would allow for such an interpretation. In other words, our lottery
example can be easily interpreted as a two-period optimization problem.
5.1 Correlation Aversion
Suppose that at date t = 1 the consumer knows her health will deteriorate
by an amount c > 0. The maximization problem (5) is then transformed into
maxU(s) = u(x ￿ s;y) + u(x + s;y ￿ c): (7)
13Evaluating the derivative of U at the previous optimum, s￿ = 0, shows that
U0(s￿) > 0 whenever u12(x;y) < 0 8(x;y). Since U is concave in s, it follows
that savings will increase in this case. Thus, correlation aversion is equivalent
to an additional savings motive for an individual whose health is declining
over time.
5.2 Cross Prudence in Wealth
Suppose now that at date t = 1 the consumer does not know what her health
status will be. In particular, she believes it will remain at level y, but there is
some risk, which we model via the zero-mean random variable e ￿. Her savings
objective is now to
maxU(s) = u(x ￿ s;y) + Eu(x + s;y +e ￿). (8)
Again evaluating the derivative of U at the previous optimum s￿ = 0 shows
that U0(s￿) ￿ 0 whenever u122(x;y) ￿ 0 8(x;y). In this case, the consumer
who perceives her health in the next period to be risky, will save more today.
Thus, cross prudence in wealth is equivalent to a motive for precautionary
savings to protect oneself against future health risk.13
5.3 Cross Prudence in Health
Here we consider an example of tertiary prevention.14 As a base case, we
assume that the individual has a ￿xed level of income in each period x.
The individual has a chronic illness that causes health to deteriorate at date
13We should point out, however, that this e⁄ect is not due to any motive to ￿nance health
treatment. In that case, both wealth and health would be a⁄ected at date t = 1 if health
is poor. Rather, the cross-prudent individual saves more only in an attempt to substitute
higher wealth, i.e. more material goods, to compensate for possibly deteriorating health.
14Tertiary prevention activities involve treating an established disease or chronic illness
in an attempt to minimize the future negative health e⁄ects of the disease or illness. See,
U.S. Preventive Services Task Force (1996).
14t = 1 from y to y ￿ c. At date t = 0, the individual can "invest" some
of her current health in such tertiary care. We assume that the monetary
cost of this preventative care is negligible. The care itself lowers the status
of current health, for example via side e⁄ects, but it mitigates the future
negative e⁄ects of the illness at date t = 1. In particular, let z denote the
level of care chosen, where such a choice lowers the current health status
from level y to y ￿ z. In return, such a choice increases the status of future
health from y ￿ c to y ￿ c + ￿z, where ￿ > 0 re￿ ects the e⁄ect per "unit" of
tertiary prevention.
The individual￿ s decision problem is thus
maxU(z) = u(x;y ￿ z) + u(x;y ￿ c + ￿z): (9)
The ￿rst-order condition for this optimization is
U
0(z) = ￿u2(x;y ￿ z) + ￿u2(x;y ￿ c + ￿z) = 0; (10)
which holds at some care level z￿.
We now suppose that income in the second period becomes risky and
equals x+e ", where Ee " = 0. It follows in a straightforward manner that the
optimal care level z￿ will increase whenever
Eu2(x +e ";y ￿ c + ￿z) > u2(x;y ￿ c + ￿z),
which will hold whenever u2 is convex in x, i.e. whenever u112 > 0. In
this case, the individual who is cross prudent in health will "invest" more in
tertiary preventative care at date t = 0 in order to increase her health status
at date t = 1. This increased health status helps her to cope with the "pain"
of risky income at date t = 1.
155.4 Cross Temperance
For this example, we consider an individual who is cross temperate (u1122 < 0)
and for whom u122 is of uniform sign throughout the relevant range of wealth
and health levels. That is, either u122 > 0 (cross prudence in wealth) or
u122 < 0 (cross imprudence in wealth) holds for all relevant wealth and health
levels. As a base case, suppose for now that the individual￿ s health is the
same in both periods. The individual still has an income of x in each period,
but now has an additional lifetime net asset value of e ", Ee " = 0, where " > 0
indicates a net asset and " < 0 indicates a net liability. The individual must
decide at date t = 0, but before e " is realized, how to distribute the e "-risk
over the two periods. This consumer￿ s initial objective is to choose ￿ 2 [0;1]
to
maxU(￿) = Eu(x + ￿e ";y) + Eu(x + (1 ￿ ￿)e ";y): (11)
The ￿rst order condition is
U
0(￿) = E[u1(x + ￿e ";y)e "] ￿ E[u1(x + (1 ￿ ￿)e ";y)e "] = 0: (12)
Since U is concave in ￿ (assuming that u11 < 0), the ￿rst-order condition in-
dicates a unique optimum at ￿￿ = 1
2: the individual chooses to fully diversify
the e "-risk over the two time periods.
Now suppose that we introduce the zero-mean health risk e ￿ at date t = 1.
The new objective is thus
maxU(￿) = Eu(x + ￿e ";y) + Eu(x + (1 ￿ ￿)e ";y +e ￿): (13)






) = E[u1(x +
1
2
e ";y)e "] ￿ E[u1(x +
1
2
e ";y +e ￿)e "]: (14)
The individual will increase ￿￿ and bear more of the wealth-risk in the ￿rst
16period whenever U0(1
2) > 0.
De￿ne H(x;y) ￿ E[u1(x + 1
2e ";y)e "]. Then U0(1
2) > 0 will follow if H is
concave in y, i.e. H22(x;y) < 0. But, since u122 is assumed to be of uniform


















Thus, the cross-temperate individual modi￿es her behavior and accepts a
larger share of the e "-risk in the ￿rst period.
6 Conclusion
We have shown how the signs of various cross derivatives of a multivariate
utility function are equivalent to a particular type of simple lottery prefer-
ence. The structure of the lotteries is particularly simple, with all of our
lotteries being simple 50-50 binary lotteries. The simplicity of the structure
would seem to make them quite adaptable to laboratory experiments.
Within the expected-utility framework, there has been much literature
that depends upon the signs of these cross derivatives. Our results give a
lottery-preference equivalent to signing these cross derivatives. Since our
lotteries are not de￿ned unique to the expected-utility preference functional,
other decision-theoretic paradigms can be compared to the concepts.
Our goal in the paper is not to claim that the concepts we de￿ned ￿
correlation aversion, cross prudence and cross temperance ￿are in any way
inherent traits of most consumers. Indeed, for readers who doubt that the
lottery preference orderings de￿ned by these concepts, or the reverse order-
ings, will always hold, our results show that it is not possible for the cross
partial derivatives to be of a consistent sign.
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